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FEDERAL SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION AS 
A LAWMAKING PARTNERSHIP  
JILL E. FISCH

 
ABSTRACT 
In its most recent Halliburton II decision, the Supreme Court rejected 
an effort to overrule its prior decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. The Court 
reasoned that adherence to Basic was warranted by principles of stare 
decisis that operate with “special force” in the context of statutory 
interpretation. This Article offers an alternative justification for adhering 
to Basic—the collaboration between the Court and Congress that has led 
to the development of the private class action for federal securities fraud. 
The Article characterizes this collaboration as a lawmaking partnership 
and argues that such a partnership offers distinctive lawmaking 
advantages. 
Halliburton II offered a compelling illustration of the lawmaking 
partnership, as Congress and the Court together used the Basic decision 
as a building block to enable and then refine private securities fraud class 
actions. Notably, Congress took affirmative steps through legislation—the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act—to balance the competing policy objectives of 
allowing effective enforcement while limiting the potential for abusive 
litigation. The process illustrates the three critical components of a 
lawmaking partnership: an open-textured statute, sequential adjustments 
to the statutory scheme by both the Court and Congress, and a set of 
common objectives to guide the lawmaking enterprise. 
This Article argues that the existence of a lawmaking partnership 
offers the Court the freedom to engage in explicit policy analysis of a type 
that is inconsistent with a traditional textualist approach. Put differently, 
the partnership operates as a type of rule of construction allowing the 
Court to engage in its own analysis of the interpretation that will best 
further congressional objectives.  
The lawmaking partnership also offers distinctive lawmaking 
advantages, including efficiency, political insulation, and comparative 
institutional competence. An exploration of these advantages can be used 
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to identify the potential value of the lawmaking partnership beyond federal 
securities fraud.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The lawmaking power is generally understood to reside primarily in the 
legislative branch.
1
 In the case of federal law, that branch is Congress.
2
 
Yet it is well documented that Congress does not exercise exclusive 
federal lawmaking power.
3
 The federal courts play an important 
lawmaking role by interpreting federal statutes and creating interstitial 
law.
4
 Similarly, the growth of the administrative state has placed primary 
lawmaking authority for many substantive areas into the hands of 
unelected officials at administrative and independent agencies.
5
  
Coordinating and balancing the exercise of lawmaking power among 
these three actors raises difficult questions. These questions include the 
extent of Congress’s power to delegate lawmaking authority,6 the weight 
to be given to interpretative material beyond the statutory text,
7
 and the 
legal significance of Congress’s failure to take action in response to a 
judicial or agency interpretation.
8
 At the constitutional level, the debate 
raises important separation-of-powers concerns.
9
 Separate from the 
constitutional questions, however, are broader policy questions about 
comparative institutional competence and the extent to which choices 
among lawmakers should reflect considerations of efficiency, expertise, 
and political accountability.
10
 
 
 
 1. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 331 
(1999) (“Article I, Section 1, vests legislative power in the Congress.”). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (vesting the “legislative” power in Congress). 
 3. Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 407 (2008) (“It has long been recognized that some 
measure of lawmaking outside of Congress is permissible, even desirable.”). 
 4. See generally Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: 
Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2006). 
 5. See Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 710 (1994) 
(reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)). 
 6. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to 
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097 (2004). 
 7. See Lemos, supra note 3, at 431 (considering debate over whether interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute allows courts to implement their policy judgments as opposed to those of Congress). 
 8. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
67 (1988). 
 9. See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional 
Sherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 267, 267–68 n.9 (1986) (identifying separation-of-powers 
concerns with judicial lawmaking under the Sherman Act). 
 10. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/12
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This Article does not attempt to resolve broad questions about the 
legitimacy or desirability of congressional delegations of the lawmaking 
function. Instead, this Article uses the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton II”)11 to identify 
a new lawmaking model. This Article argues that Congress and the 
Supreme Court have developed the scope of federal securities fraud 
litigation through a collaborative process, a process that this Article terms 
a lawmaking partnership.
12
 
The partnership should operate as a rule of construction.
13
 Where the 
Court finds evidence of this type of collaborative process,
14
 the lawmaking 
partnership should authorize the Court to use policy analysis in its 
interpretation of the authorizing statute to determine how best to further 
Congress’s lawmaking objectives. In Halliburton II, this canon of 
construction provides independent support for adhering to the Basic 
decision.
15
 
The Article argues that not only is a lawmaking partnership an accurate 
description of the process used by the Court and Congress to develop the 
legal contours of private securities fraud litigation, but also that, in 
appropriate cases, it is a normatively desirable method of making 
securities law. In particular, the lawmaking partnership offers distinctive 
advantages over alternatives such as a narrow adherence to statutory text 
coupled with detailed statutory guidance, on the one hand, or a broad 
delegation to judicial or agency lawmaking, on the other.  
In Halliburton II, the Court considered the continued viability of a 
judicially-created doctrine—fraud on the market (“FOTM”).16 The Court 
had previously created FOTM in Basic Inc. v. Levinson
17
 as a tool to 
 
 
 11. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 12. The partnership construct developed in this Article is conceptually similar to, but more 
bounded than, the manner in which Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer have used the term. See, e.g., 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the 
War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2041 (2007) (arguing that “[i]n the case of statutory 
interpretation, courts play the role of junior partners to Congress”). 
 13. See generally Quintin Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1 (1954) (analyzing rules of statutory construction). 
 14. See infra Part IV (describing the criteria for identifying a lawmaking partnership). 
 15. This Article does not take on the normative question of whether the Court should use policy 
analysis in a broader set of cases than those involving the lawmaking partnership as described herein. 
For greater attention to this issue, see, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 345 (calling for “a less passive attitude toward judicial lawmaking” in 
subconstitutional matters). 
 16. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4–5, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. 
John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317). 
 17. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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enable plaintiffs in impersonal public capital-markets transactions to 
address the reliance requirement in federal securities fraud class actions.
18
  
By enabling the class action, FOTM dramatically changed the nature of 
private securities fraud litigation and generated large-scale cases involving 
substantial potential damages.
19
 In turn, these developments led to 
complaints about the resulting scope of litigation and the potential for 
litigation abuse.
20
 Some commentators demanded that the Court reconsider 
its earlier decision.
21
 Commentators also raised their concerns in 
Congress.
22
  
Although the Court did not revisit the validity of FOTM prior to 
Halliburton II, it responded to claims of abusive litigation by imposing 
various limitations on the private right of action.
23
 Similarly, although 
Congress did not speak directly to the validity of FOTM, it responded by 
enacting statutory reforms, first in the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)24 and then in the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act (“SLUSA”).25 Both the Court’s decisions and Congress’s 
refinements to the statutory framework reflected a common goal of 
reducing the prospective of costly and frivolous litigation while 
maintaining the viability of private litigation as a means of enforcing the 
disclosure obligations of the federal securities laws. 
 
 
 18.  Id. at 246–48, 248 n.27. 
 19. See Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 895, 896 n.2 (2013) (citing sources describing litigation response to the Basic decision); Donald 
C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 153 (stating 
that “[s]oon after Basic, the number of [open-market securities fraud] suits rose dramatically”). 
 20. See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 
533, 533 (1997) (describing claims of abusive private securities fraud litigation). 
 21. See, e.g., Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law Professors as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 
(2014) (No. 13-317) (urging the Court to “grant certiorari to overrule Basic’s fraud-on-the-market 
holding”).  
 22. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Concerning 
Litigation Reform Proposals Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, 
Committee on Commerce, United States House of Representatives (Feb. 10, 1995), available at 
www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1995/spch025.txt (testifying against original provision in 
House Report 10 that would have overruled Basic). The provision was subsequently deleted from the 
legislation that became the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
 23. See, e.g., Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–46 (2005) (adopting strict 
requirement that plaintiff establish loss causation); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank 
of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) (rejecting aiding and abetting liability). 
 24. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 25. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/12
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The Court in Halliburton II did not discuss this cooperative enterprise 
in its opinion; instead, it based its decision on principles of stare decisis.
26
 
Nonetheless, this Article argues that evidence of a lawmaking partnership 
supplies an independent justification for the Court’s decision. More 
significantly, the Article argues that the virtues of the lawmaking 
partnership extend beyond the issue of FOTM and should be considered 
by the Court in evaluating the scope of its lawmaking power with respect 
to federal securities fraud. Specifically, the lawmaking partnership should 
give rise to a canon of construction by which the Court determines how 
best to further congressional objectives, rather than limiting its inquiry to 
the contours of the statutory text. 
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, the Article briefly recounts 
the traditional story positioning the federal lawmaking function in 
Congress and the debate over the relationship between that story and 
congressional delegations of lawmaking power to the courts and federal 
agencies. Part III describes the Supreme Court’s decision in Halliburton 
II. Part IV conceptualizes the lawmaking partnership and identifies its 
structural advantages with respect to the development of federal securities 
law. Finally, Part V extends the analysis beyond FOTM and, using the 
example of insider trading regulation, explains the potential value of the 
lawmaking partnership in enabling Congress, the courts, and the Securities 
& Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to collaborate on the development of 
federal securities law.  
II. THE JUDICIAL OAK OF PRIVATE SECURITIES FRAUD 
The starting point for understanding the federal lawmaking power is 
Article I of the US Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States.”27 While this Constitutional text would appear to vest exclusive 
lawmaking power in Congress, the lawmaking function of the federal 
courts and government agencies is widely accepted. As Thomas Merrill 
explains: “the notion that Congress is the exclusive federal lawmaking 
body is an oversimplification of constitutional reality.”28  
 
 
 26. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014) (holding that 
petitioners failed to provide “special justification” for overruling Basic). 
 27.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 28. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 21 
(1985). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Federal lawmaking occurs outside of Congress in two distinct fora. 
First, Congress delegates extensive lawmaking power to executive and 
independent agencies. Beginning at the end of the nineteenth century with 
the rise of the administrative state, federal agencies have exercised an 
increasing percentage of the federal lawmaking power.
29
 This development 
raised questions about the extent to which Congress could delegate 
lawmaking authority to agencies, questions that are addressed by the 
nondelegation doctrine.
30
 Broadly speaking, the nondelegation doctrine 
accepts the premise that Congress may permissibly delegate some degree 
of lawmaking power to agencies, but also that the Constitution imposes 
limits on the scope of that delegation, providing that a delegation may 
exceed constitutional limits if Congress does not retain for itself the role of 
making the critical policy choices that underlie legislation.
31
 
Courts also make federal law. At a minimum, the process of 
interpreting federal statutes requires courts to engage in interstitial 
lawmaking—addressing questions that the statute does not answer. In 
some substantive areas, however, Congress has gone further, enacting 
broad legislation and calling upon “the courts to give shape to the statute’s 
broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.”32 The Sherman 
Antitrust Act is commonly cited as an example of this type of legislation.
33
 
As Margaret Lemos explains: “The Sherman Act is a clear-cut and self-
conscious delegation of lawmaking power to courts.”34  
Although the Court has applied different doctrinal principles to judicial 
and agency lawmaking, some commentators question whether framing the 
distinction in binary terms is appropriate.
35
 Importantly, analyzing the 
appropriate scope of non-legislative lawmaking power entails a common 
question: to what extent should non-congressional lawmaking be driven by 
policy considerations not specifically identified by Congress?
36
  
 
 
 29. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 
422 n.1 (1987) (observing that the rise of the administrative state began in the “latter part of the 
[nineteenth] century and the first two decades of [the twentieth] century”). 
 30. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1231, 1241 (1994) (explaining that “the demise of the nondelegation doctrine . . . allows the national 
government’s now-general legislative powers to be exercised by administrative agencies”). 
 31. Id. at 1237–41. 
 32. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). 
 33. Lemos, supra note 3, at 429.  
 34. Id.  
 35. See id.; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 
OKLA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004) (explaining that “what judges have done is little different from what the 
FTC does”).  
 36. There are somewhat different reasons to defend a policy-oriented approach to agency 
lawmaking, in that Congress may seek to use the structural advantages of administrative agencies to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/12
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This question underlies, in part, a debate about the most appropriate 
methodology for statutory interpretation by the courts. Advocates of a 
textualist approach, such as Justice Antonin Scalia, ground their defense of 
textualism in the constitutional requirements for lawmaking.
37
 Textualists 
argue that only the legislative text itself—and not its intentions or 
purposes—passed “the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and 
presentment.”38 As such, they view departures from textualism as 
infringing upon Congress’s lawmaking power.39 Other commentators take 
a more purposivist approach, in which they consider the policy context in 
which Congress has acted in promulgating legislation and the purposes to 
which that legislation was addressed.
40
 
This debate has an important role in the development of the private 
right of action for federal securities fraud. The antifraud provision of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is frequently described as an open-ended 
statute that authorizes broad judicial lawmaking,
41
 although it contains no 
express private right of action.
42
 As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen 
we deal with private [securities fraud] actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal 
with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative 
acorn.”43 As a result, the courts have taken primary responsibility for 
developing the scope of the private right of action and articulating the 
legal requirements for a successful claim. 
 
 
formulate policy. Margaret Lemos has explored various arguments regarding the relative advantages 
associated with the choice of delegate. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s 
Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 361, 372–73 
(2010).  
 37. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (defending Justice Scalia’s view of textualism). 
 38. Elliott M. Davis, Note, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory Interpretation, 30 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 988 (2007). 
 39. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 
707–10 (1997). 
 40. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 
76 (2006) (explaining purposivism); Meltzer, supra note 15, at 383–86 (grounding argument for more 
extensive judicial lawmaking role in limitations of congressional foresight and capacity). 
 41. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1007, 1052 (1989) (describing Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act and the anti-fraud provisions of the 
securities laws as “common law statutes”); see also Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal 
Common Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1 (2015) (analyzing judicial lawmaking in the federal common law 
context). 
 42. In contrast, the federal securities laws contain a number of provisions that create an express 
private right of action, including sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act and sections 9(e) and 18 of the 
1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k–l, 78i(e), 78r (2014); see also, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp’rs 
Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 296 (1993) (identifying “eight express liability provisions contained in 
the 1933 and 1934 Acts”). 
 43. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The judicial development of private securities fraud litigation began in 
the lower courts, which recognized an implied private right of action under 
SEC Rule 10b-5 as early as 1946.
44
 Although the Supreme Court did not 
reject the private right of action, its early decisions largely articulated 
limitations on the scope of a 10b-5 claim.
45
 Thus, in Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, the Court held that a 10b-5 claim could not be predicated 
upon a showing of mere negligence but required proof of scienter.
46
 In 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the Court limited standing in 
private litigation to plaintiffs who had purchased or sold securities in 
connection with the fraud.
47
 In Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, the 
Court rejected an attempt to address a breach of fiduciary duty through a 
10b-5 claim.
48
  
Even before the rise of the new textualism, the Court grounded these 
holdings largely on textualist grounds.
49
 Policy considerations were not, 
however, absent from the Court’s analysis. Rather, throughout its 
development of private securities fraud litigation the Court sought to 
balance the two competing interests of protecting investors and limiting 
the potential for litigation abuse. In Blue Chip Stamps, for example, the 
Court justified its restriction on the class of potential plaintiffs in terms of 
“considerations of policy,” including a desire to limit the potential 
settlement value of lawsuits that could not easily be dismissed prior to 
trial.
50
 Similarly, in Sante Fe, the Court identified the concern that a more 
expansive interpretation of 10b-5 would create a “danger of vexatious 
litigation.”51  
The Court’s 1988 decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson was different both 
in the Court’s extensive reliance on policy considerations and in the fact 
that the decision expanded the scope of 10b-5 litigation.
52
 In Basic, the 
Court concluded that private plaintiffs need not offer direct proof of 
reliance but can use the fraud-on-the-market theory to obtain a 
 
 
 44. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
 45. See Michael J. Kaufman, The Uniform Rule of Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws: 
The Judicial Creation of a Comprehensive Scheme of Investor Insurance, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 86 
(1990). 
 46. 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
 47. 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975). 
 48. 430 U.S. 462, 474–76 (1977). 
 49. See, e.g., id. at 477 (“The language of the statute is, we think, ‘sufficiently clear in its 
context’ to be dispositive here . . . .”) (quoting Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201). 
 50.  Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 742–44. 
 51. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 478–79 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
 52. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/12
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presumption of reliance for securities that traded in an efficient market 
tainted by public misrepresentations.
53
 Commentators have described the 
Basic decision as opening the floodgates.
54
 Yet, even in Basic, the Court’s 
role was one of reining in more expansive lower court lawmaking.
55
  
The Basic Court explicitly explained that it was necessary to adapt the 
common-law reliance requirement to the realities of the modern securities 
markets.
56
 Moreover, the Basic Court justified its acceptance of the FOTM 
presumption not in terms of the statutory text or even congressional intent, 
but on the basis of “considerations of fairness, public policy, and 
probability, as well as judicial economy.”57 These considerations were 
based, in part, on the need to “balance[e] the substantive requirement of 
proof of reliance in securities cases against the procedural requisites of 
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23.”58 
Importantly, the Court did not act alone in developing the scope of 
private securities fraud litigation. Congress responded to the foregoing 
judicial interpretations through explicit statutory provisions that in some 
cases clarified and in other cases modified the judicially-created legal 
rules. In 1995, Congress adopted the PSLRA.
59
 The PSLRA, which grew 
out of the Common Sense Legal Reform Act, reflected both congressional 
acceptance of the judicially-created private right of action and a 
reassertion of congressional authority over the scope of that right of 
action. Included in the statutory provision were a heightened pleading 
standard, a discovery stay, an explicit loss-causation requirement, and 
refinements to the calculation of damages.
60
 In addition, Congress adopted 
a lead-plaintiff provision in an effort to respond to the argument that 
securities fraud class actions constituted “lawyer-driven litigation.”61  
 
 
 53. Id. at 247–48. 
 54. See Fisch, supra note 19, at 896 n.2 (citing commentary on the effect of Basic). 
 55. See id. at 910 (stating that “Basic is properly understood not as a revolution, but a 
retrenchment”).  
 56.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 243–47. 
 57. Id. at 245.  
 58. Id. at 242 (1988) (quoting another source) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The modern 
securities markets, literally involving millions of shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-to-
face transactions contemplated by early fraud cases . . . .” Id. at 243–44. 
 59. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  
 60. See Fisch, supra note 20, at 536–37 (describing provisions of the PSLRA). 
 61. See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead 
Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 60 (2001) (describing adoption of the 
lead-plaintiff provision).  
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Subsequently, in 1998, Congress enacted SLUSA.
62
 The statute 
preempted state-court litigation for “covered class actions” in order to 
ensure that those cases were subject to the provisions of the PSLRA.
63
 In 
2002, Congress also extended the statute of limitations in private securities 
fraud litigation.
64
 
In legislating private securities fraud, Congress reaffirmed the critical 
policy considerations that had previously been identified by the Court. 
Congress explicitly recognized the importance of private litigation as a 
supplement to public enforcement efforts. Thus, the statement of managers 
accompanying the conference report for the PSLRA described private 
securities litigation as “an indispensable tool,” both for protecting 
investors and for “promot[ing] public and global confidence in our capital 
markets.”65 This policy judgment is consistent with the Court’s analysis. 
As the Court has repeatedly explained, “private securities litigation [i]s an 
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their 
losses—a matter crucial to the integrity of domestic capital markets.”66  
At the same time, Congress sought to structure private litigation so as 
to minimize the potential for vexatious litigation.
67
 In the PSLRA, 
Congress chose to retain the private securities fraud class action but to 
refine its use by implementing substantive and procedural safeguards 
against overuse and abuse.
68
 These safeguards serve similar policy 
objectives as the limitations imposed by the Court in cases like Ernst, Blue 
Chip Stamps, and Central Bank.  
III. HALLIBURTON II 
A. The Halliburton Decision 
In Halliburton II, the Court considered the question of whether to 
overrule its prior decision in Basic, which had allowed plaintiffs to obtain 
 
 
 62. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2014). 
 65. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995). 
 66. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 n.4 (2007) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006)). 
 67. See Fisch, supra note 20, at 534–35 (explaining congressional objective of reducing abusive 
litigation). 
 68. See Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802, 810 (“Congress chose not to eliminate the securities fraud class action, but 
to cure it and thus confirmed its importance to the integrity of the U.S. capital markets.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/12
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class certification on the basis of the FOTM presumption of reliance.
69
 The 
decision followed several prior attempts by defendants to limit securities 
fraud class actions. The Halliburton case had previously been before the 
Supreme Court in a decision in which the Court held that plaintiffs were 
not required to establish loss causation in order to obtain class 
certification.
70
 The following term, in Amgen, the Court similarly held that 
proof of materiality was not required at the class-certification stage.
71
  
Four justices in Amgen raised questions, however, about the continued 
viability of FOTM.
72
 Justice Alito wrote, in a concurring opinion, that 
FOTM “may rest on a faulty economic premise.”73 Justice Thomas, joined 
in dissent by Justice Kennedy and in part by Justice Scalia, wrote that the 
Basic decision was “questionable” and observed that there was academic 
disagreement over the degree of market efficiency upon which Basic was 
premised.
74
 
Petitioners in Halliburton II seized upon these statements. They argued 
that academic consensus and new evidence about market efficiency had 
undermined the economic theory upon which Basic was based, and that 
the Court should therefore overrule Basic.
75
  
The Supreme Court disagreed.
76
 The Court explained that the 
petitioners had overstated the degree to which the Basic decision relied on 
strong claims of market efficiency.
77
 Instead, the Court stated that the 
presumption of reliance rested on the “modest premise” that “public 
information generally affects stock prices.”78 The Court thereby reasoned 
that the modern debate about the “degree” to which prices accurately 
reflect public information is “largely beside the point.”79 Similarly, the 
Court reaffirmed Basic’s determination that most investors rely on a 
 
 
 69. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014) (describing 
questions presented). 
 70. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185–86 (2011). 
 71. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013). 
 72. Id. at 1204–16. 
 73. Id. at 1204. He therefore reasoned that “reconsideration of the Basic presumption may be 
appropriate.” Id. 
 74. Id. at 1208 n.4. 
 75. Brief for Petitioners at 15–17, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 
(2014) (No. 13-317). 
 76. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 77. Id. at 2409. 
 78. Id. at 2410. 
 79. Id. 
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security’s market price “as an unbiased assessment of the security’s value 
in light of all public information.”80  
More importantly, the Court observed that Basic’s presumption of 
reliance, as a substantive doctrine of federal securities law, was entitled to 
stare decisis principles.
81
 It reasoned that principles of stare decisis apply 
with “special force” in the area of statutory interpretation.82 The Court 
stated that absent special justification, which the Court found lacking, it 
was inappropriate to overrule Basic.
83
  
B. An Alternative Theory for Retaining Basic 
In ruling on the request to overrule Basic, the Halliburton II Court 
focused the bulk of its attention on the Basic decision itself. The Court 
considered the issues that the Basic Court had decided, explicitly and 
implicitly, in that decision.
84
 The Court also reflected upon whether it was 
appropriate to look to developments in economics as a basis for 
reconsidering the reasoning in Basic.
85
  
Yet, it is possible to uphold FOTM on a different theory. As explained 
in Part II above, a key feature of federal securities fraud litigation is that it 
has been the focus of a collaborative lawmaking partnership between 
Congress and the Court. This collaboration is entitled to special weight 
and distinguishes Congress’s role from standard legislative inaction. 
Accordingly, this Article makes the novel claim that the Court should 
view the existence of the collaborative process as an independent 
justification for adhering to Basic. More broadly, the collaboration enables 
the Court to evaluate FOTM in the context of the policy considerations 
that justify retaining private securities fraud class actions. 
As explained above, the Court and Congress have both contributed to 
the development of the private right of action for federal securities fraud. 
 
 
 80. Id. at 2411 (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 
(2013)). 
 81. Id. at 2411–12. 
 82. Id. at 2411 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83. Id. at 2407–13. The Court went on to consider a second argument by petitioners concerning 
evidence of price distortion. Id. at 2409–11. It concluded that the defendants in an FOTM case should 
be allowed, at class certification, to introduce evidence of lack of price distortion to rebut the 
presumption of reliance. Id. at 2414–17. I address this aspect of Halliburton II elsewhere. See Jill E. 
Fisch, The Future of Price Distortion in Federal Securities Fraud Litigation, 10 DUKE J. CONST’L L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 87, 95–96 (2015). 
 84. See, e.g., Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2409 (refusing to reconsider an argument previously 
rejected by the Basic majority). 
 85. See id. (analyzing petitioner’s argument that the two premises upon which Basic was based 
“can no longer withstand scrutiny”). 
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In understanding Halliburton II, however, it is important to recognize that 
a major focus of this collaboration has been the securities fraud class 
action. The Supreme Court’s acceptance of FOTM in Basic was motivated 
by an effort to enable securities fraud class actions to conform to the 
commonality requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
86
 
Similarly, the PSLRA responded to concerns about abusive litigation with 
a range of procedural reforms expressly targeted to the class action.
87
 
SLUSA, in turn, confirmed the focus of the PSLRA by preventing litigants 
from using state court litigation to avoid these reforms.
88
 
Basic was clearly premised on the need to reconcile securities fraud 
litigation with Rule 23’s class action requirements. The Basic Court 
explained: “Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member 
of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would have prevented 
respondents from proceeding with a class action, since individual issues 
then would have overwhelmed the common ones.”89 The Court went on to 
note with approval the District Court’s conclusion that FOTM offered “a 
practical resolution to the problem of balancing the substantive 
requirement of proof of reliance in securities cases against the procedural 
requisites of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23.”90 
This focus was consistent with the intent of the Federal Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee, which drafted Rule 23, in 1966, with securities fraud 
as a model for class litigation.
91
 As the Committee recognized, the class 
action device was also an important tool for ensuring effective 
enforcement of the federal securities laws, explicitly recognizing this 
function in developing the rule.
92
 By accepting FOTM, Basic empowered 
private securities fraud litigation to serve as a tool for effective 
enforcement and created the opportunity for the development of the 
modern securities fraud class action.  
Congress specifically focused in the PSLRA on the development of 
class action litigation. Section 21D(a) of the PSLRA is explicitly entitled 
 
 
 86. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988). 
 87. See Fisch, supra note 20, at 536-37. 
 88. See, e.g., Korsinsky v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6085(SWK), 2002 WL 
27775, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-
803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.)) (observing that SLUSA was intended to “prevent plaintiffs from 
seeking to evade the protections that Federal law provides against abusive litigation by filing suit in 
State court, rather than Federal court”). 
 89. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988). 
 90. Id. (quoting District Court) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91. See Brief for Amici Curiae Civil Procedure and Securities Law Professors in Support of 
Respondent at 5, Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (No. 11-085). 
 92. Id. 
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“Private Class Actions” and introduces a range of reforms that apply 
exclusively to securities fraud class actions.
93
 These reforms placed 
additional burdens on investors seeking to bring class actions, in an effort 
to reduce abusive litigation. By tailoring the structure of the class action 
rather than eliminating it,
94
 the PSLRA reflected an implicit congressional 
decision to retain the class action mechanism and the FOTM theory that 
made it possible.
95
 Importantly, the adoption of these reforms made little 
sense absent a desire to retain the class action mechanism. 
More broadly, the PSLRA can be understood as a legislative 
compromise in an effort to achieve two competing goals: reducing 
burdensome and potentially frivolous litigation while preserving the 
ability of investors to pursue meritorious claims. Empirical evidence 
suggests that Congress was successful in achieving both goals. Studies 
show that the adoption of the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard 
facilitated the ability of courts to dismiss weak cases.
96
 A further effect is 
that, according to some studies, plaintiffs’ lawyers screen more diligently 
for case quality and do not even file weak cases.
97
 Moreover, because of 
the PSLRA’s discovery stay, these cases do not impose burdensome 
litigation costs upon defendants.
98
  
At the same time, the lead-plaintiff provision of the PSLRA has 
dramatically increased the involvement of large institutional investors in 
securities fraud class actions.
99
 In turn, this has had the effect of increasing 
 
 
 93. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (2014); see also Fisch, supra note 20, at 536 (explaining that PSLRA 
reforms “targeted the class action structure in particular”). 
 94. “Congress chose not to eliminate the securities fraud class action, but to cure it and thus 
confirmed its importance to the integrity of the U.S. capital markets.” Black, supra note 68, at 810. 
 95. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market: Reflections on 
Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 37, 42 (2015) (“[T]he structure of the 
PSLRA makes no sense unless read as a political compromise that preserves the foundation of the 
fraud-on-the market class action while making it harder for plaintiffs to bring, plead, and prove a 
successful claim through a variety of reforms.”). 
 96. See Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 636–49 (2007).  
 97. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35 (2009). 
 98. See, e.g., Michael Klausner et al., When Are Securities Class Actions Dismissed, When Do 
They Settle, and for How Much?—An Update 1, 3 (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law 
and Econ., Working Paper No. 445, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260831 (reporting 
that “38% of [securities class actions filed between 2006 and 2010] ended relatively quickly and 
painlessly for the defendants”). 
 99. See, e.g., Michael Perino, Have Institutional Fiduciaries Improved Securities Class Actions? 
A Review of the Empirical Literature on the PSLRA’s Lead Plaintiff Provision 2 (St. John’s Sch. of 
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-0021, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2175217 (“There is little doubt that passage of the PSLRA spurred institutions to become 
more active in these cases.”). 
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settlement amounts in meritorious cases and reducing the fees paid to class 
counsel.
100
  
Congress’s adoption of SLUSA reflected similar objectives and 
enhanced the effectiveness of the PSLRA reforms. SLUSA was adopted in 
response to efforts by plaintiffs to avoid the procedural requirements of the 
PSLRA by litigating securities fraud class actions in state court.
101
 SLUSA 
eliminated these efforts by preempting state court litigation.
102
 
Significantly, SLUSA, by its terms, applies to “covered class actions,” 
demonstrating both an effort to retain the class action mechanism and to 
ensure that this litigation takes place in federal court under the provisions 
of the PSLRA.
103
 In addition, Congress defined the term “covered class 
action” explicitly to incorporate the FOTM presumption.104 
The foregoing process can be understood as sequential collaboration 
between the Court and Congress. First, the Court acted in Basic to identify 
the need for the fledgling class action mechanism to enable the cost-
effective litigation of private securities fraud claims in order to ensure the 
litigation served as a viable means of enhancing enforcement. The SEC 
evaluated the role of private litigation and defended the class action—to 
the Court and Congress—as a necessary supplement to public 
enforcement. Congress, after observing the development of the class 
action mechanism, adopted various procedures to refine its operation in 
securities fraud cases. These adjustments offered the potential for 
securities fraud class actions to offer more effective deterrence by 
increasing case quality and limiting the potential for frivolous litigation.  
The iterative adjustments to the securities fraud class action can be 
understood as a type of lawmaking partnership in which both the Court 
and Congress have recognized the objective of structuring a procedural 
device that facilitates effective enforcement of the disclosure obligations 
of the federal securities laws and affirmatively acted to further that 
 
 
 100. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff 
Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869 (2005); Michael 
Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund 
Participation in Securities Class Actions, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 368, 383–84 (2012) (“[P]ublic 
pension participation in securities class actions does indeed lead to higher settlement amounts, all else 
equal.”). 
 101. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 1 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (describing rationale for statute). 
 102. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A)–(B) (2014). 
 103. A “covered class action” is defined as a class action where “damages are sought on behalf of 
more than 50 persons or prospective class members, and questions of law or fact common to those 
persons or members of the prospective class, without reference to issues of individualized reliance on 
an alleged misstatement or omission, predominate.” Id. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(i)(I). 
 104. See id. 
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objective.
105
 Because of Congress’s role in responding to Basic and 
revising the nature of the securities fraud class action in important ways, 
Basic and its progeny are not properly understood simply as judicial 
interpretations of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. In the PSLRA and 
SLUSA, Congress did more than silently acquiesce in judicial lawmaking; 
Congress embraced and sought to improve upon the Court’s work.  
This lawmaking partnership puts FOTM on a different legal footing 
than the standard interpretation of a federal statute. The Court has 
struggled with the question of whether to give weight to congressional 
inaction. Some commentators have argued that congressional silence or 
failure to overturn judicial interpretation of a statute, at least in some 
cases, should be understood as acquiescence in that interpretation.
106
 
Others have identified the problems with relying on legislative silence as 
indicative of congressional intent, including the fact that multiple 
inferences can be drawn from Congress’s failure to act.107 The claim 
asserted in this Article is different in a critical respect. With respect to 
securities fraud class actions, Congress has taken affirmative action to 
refine and reinforce the class action mechanism. Put differently, Congress 
has expanded upon the “building block” of Basic.108 This expansion 
reinforces the Basic decision as presumptively correct.  
Importantly, this Article reads congressional lawmaking with respect to 
the securities fraud class action as an implicit endorsement of Basic. 
Concededly, this is different from an explicit congressional statement 
codifying the judge-made law, and, in the case of the PSLRA, Congress 
expressly stated that it was neither codifying nor rejecting any implied 
 
 
 105. Donald Langevoort has questioned my characterization of this collaboration as a partnership, 
observing that Congress has the upper hand in that it has the power to override judicial lawmaking. 
While the point is well taken, equal decisionmaking authority among all partners is merely a default 
rule that the parties are free to modify. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 103, 404 (1997). 
Alternatively, the Court’s role might be characterized as that of a junior partner, rather than Congress’ 
co-equal. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., On Viewing the Courts as Junior Partners of Congress in 
Statutory Interpretation Cases: An Essay Celebrating the Scholarship of Daniel Meltzer 4 (unpublished 
manuscript) (arguing that “characterization of courts as junior partners rather than mere agents implies 
that they should regard themselves as trusted rather than distrusted agents, with some latitude to look 
beyond the letter of statutory language, especially when confronting cases of a kind that Congress 
likely did not foresee at the time of a statute’s enactment”). 
 106. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 8, at 71–78. 
 107. See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002) (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, 
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (“Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable 
inferences may be drawn from such inaction . . . .”); Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 186 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (“It is impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to 
act represents affirmative congressional approval of the [courts’] statutory interpretation . . . .”). 
 108. See generally Eskridge, supra note 8. 
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private right of action.
109
 As will be developed further below, Congress 
might have a variety of reasons for failing to codify such a right of action 
expressly, including political constraints and a reluctance to constrain the 
scope of future judicial interpretation. These considerations, as will be 
discussed, are fundamental reasons for the use of a lawmaking partnership 
in preference to constraining judicial lawmaking through a more restrictive 
statute. 
The implications of the lawmaking partnership constitute more than a 
reason for the Court not to overrule a prior interpretive decision, however. 
The collaboration reflected in the partnership context suggests that the 
Court should understand congressional interventions such as the PSLRA 
as refinements rather than rejections of its approach.  
IV. CONCEPTUALIZING THE LAWMAKING PARTNERSHIP 
Halliburton II’s decision to reaffirm Basic is supported by the 
lawmaking partnership that has led to the development of the securities 
fraud class action. The existence of a lawmaking partnership is not unique 
to securities fraud litigation, however. A similar analysis should apply in 
other areas in which Congress and the Court have engaged in collaborative 
lawmaking. Simply put, judge-made law in the form of a statutory 
interpretation that has been developed or reinforced through a lawmaking 
partnership should be viewed by the courts as presumptively correct 
absent clear congressional action overruling it.  
Three distinctive features of a lawmaking partnership warrant this 
presumption. First, the original statute, as with section 10(b), must be the 
type of open-textured statute that permits judicial lawmaking through the 
process of statutory interpretation. Second, Congress and the Court must 
engage in sequential adjustments, in each case cognizant of and 
responding to concerns that are raised in the other forum. Third, Congress 
and the Court must make these adjustments in furtherance of a common 
objective.  
Each of these features is a necessary component of a lawmaking 
partnership. The first, an open-textured statute, has received considerable 
attention in the academic literature.
110
 Commentators argue that Congress 
uses this type of legislation purposefully to enable a common-law 
 
 
 109. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 203, 109 Stat. 737, 762 
(1995). 
 110. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Chevron and Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517, 
1546 (2014); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 338–39. 
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process.
111
 Although this Article does not take a normative position on 
whether such congressional delegations are desirable, it is reasonable to 
conclude that Congress chooses to use an open-textured statute in cases in 
which it contemplates a more expansive interpretive role for the courts. 
Reasons for this more expansive role might include limited congressional 
knowledge of the consequences of specific regulatory choices and a desire 
to encourage the type of evolutionary approach that characterizes 
common-law lawmaking.
112
  
The second feature, sequential adjustments by both the Court and 
Congress, distinguishes the lawmaking partnership from mere 
congressional inaction. By taking affirmative steps in response to judicial 
lawmaking, Congress demonstrates that its failure to reject features of the 
judge-made law is not the result of political gridlock or inattention.
113
 By 
definition, congressional responsiveness to the Court’s interpretation 
reflects awareness of the Court’s actions. Similarly, the responsive 
legislation constitutes action rather than inaction, thereby belying 
arguments that Congress was unable to react to an erroneous interpretation 
because of gridlock, other policy priorities, or inertia.  
Finally, a lawmaking partnership is characterized by a common set of 
policy objectives. This distinguishes the lawmaking partnership as a 
common enterprise rather than two actors that are competing or working at 
cross-purposes. Specifically, congressional responses to the Court’s 
interpretation should reflect a consistency rather than a replacement of the 
policy objectives identified by the Court. Similarly, congressional action 
that seeks to correct errors in the Court’s approach or to update policies 
that have become obsolete would not qualify.  
In the context of private securities fraud litigation, the partnership 
structure offers distinctive lawmaking advantages. One advantage is that it 
enables Congress to achieve a level of political insulation with respect to 
its enforcement policy. Private securities fraud litigation is a political hot 
potato and, as a result, an area in which interest-group politics is a 
particular concern.
114
 Corporate issuers and their executives face 
 
 
 111. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
405, 422 (1989) (describing the Sherman Act as “delegat[ing] power to make common law”). 
 112. See Eskridge, supra note 41, at 1063 (citing examples). 
 113. This is analogous to the concept of ratified interpretations. If, for example, Congress reenacts 
statutory language that has previously been interpreted by the courts, it is presumed to have approved 
the interpretation. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 
1021 (1992). 
 114. Cf. Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial 
Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2044 (2014) (noting that the problem of legislative 
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substantial liability risk in private litigation and incur considerable costs in 
both insurance and litigation defense. These defendants pressure Congress 
to reduce the scope of their liability risk by restricting private litigation. 
On the other hand, the plaintiffs’ bar is a formidable political force as well. 
One study reports that the amount donated by lawyers, primarily plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, to federal political candidates since 1990 is more than $1 
billion.
115
 Putting aside the extent to which political donations and 
lobbying influence congressional policymaking, it is easier for Congress to 
delegate determination of the scope of private litigation to the federal 
judiciary, which enjoys life tenure. Judicial lawmaking also provides a 
mechanism to overcome the gridlock that might result from high levels of 
interest-group engagement. 
The lawmaking partnership also exploits the differential institutional 
competencies of the Court and Congress. The evaluation of the scope and 
quality of private litigation is a subject that is peculiarly within the 
competence of the judiciary. The courts can readily observe the quality of 
private lawsuits and the extent to which litigation filings are correlated 
with serious misconduct. The courts can also determine the effect of 
various reforms such as a heightened pleading standard on litigation 
volume and case quality. At the same time, Congress has the capacity to 
consider evidence that the courts cannot observe. This evidence might 
include the effect of litigation costs on issuers’ decisions to go public or to 
list their securities in the United States, or the effect of private 
enforcement on the capital markets.
116
 Thus, even with a common 
objective, the Courts and Congress can bring distinct issues of competence 
to the question of how best to achieve that objective. 
By delegating the development of private enforcement to the courts, 
Congress creates a potential check on the possibility of agency capture.
117
 
The antifraud provision, like most of the federal securities laws, can be 
enforced by the SEC as well as private litigants.
118
 Some commentators 
have advocated for the elimination of private securities fraud litigation, 
 
 
capture is “particularly pronounced in financial services” because of the substantial industry clout 
effected through political donations and lobbying). 
 115. See, e.g., James R. Copland, How the Plaintiffs Bar Bought the Senate, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 
2010, 6:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703630404575053330978667138. 
 116. Congress may also be in a better position than the courts to evaluate effects outside the 
litigation context, such as effects on the provision of financial products or the depth of the capital 
markets. 
 117. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010) (discussing problem of agency capture). 
 118. See, e.g., What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo. 
shtml (last visited Nov. 10, 2015) (describing the SEC’s enforcement authority). 
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arguing for the superiority of public enforcement.
119
 Yet the effectiveness 
of public enforcement depends critically on the SEC’s exercise of its 
enforcement authority.
120
 An important constraint on public enforcement is 
the availability of resources—the SEC depends on Congress for funding, 
and Congress can limit enforcement activity just by closing the purse-
strings.
121
 In addition, the broad scope of regulation and actors subject to 
federal securities regulation requires the SEC to make policy choices. SEC 
officials and staff may make such choices for a variety of reasons—such 
as a desire to appeal to the media, to further personal career objectives, or 
to assuage congressional critics.
122
 The courts are particularly well 
positioned to observe the areas in which SEC enforcement operates 
effectively. Although the courts cannot address deficiencies in public 
enforcement directly,
123
 they can identify those areas in which private 
enforcement is serving as a useful supplement by targeting conduct or 
defendants that are not the focus of the regulators.
124
  
Finally, the lawmaking partnership offers a dynamic process. 
Common-law adjudication has long been defended on the basis of its 
ability to operate incrementally and to evolve in response to changing 
circumstances.
125
 These features prevent the type of obsolescence that can 
occur in both congressional and agency lawmaking. In the context of 
financial regulation, this flexibility and responsiveness are particularly 
valuable because of the speed at which the market changes, creating new 
 
 
 119. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the 
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011). 
 120. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection in 
the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1604–05 (2006) (scrutinizing the “revolving 
door” of SEC lawyers and private practice and its connection to new regulations). 
 121. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for 
Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 319 n.340 (2005) 
(quoting Aulana L. Peters, Independent Agencies: Government’s Scourge or Salvation?, 1988 DUKE 
L.J. 286, 294) (explaining that “the Commission, like most agencies, depends entirely on funds 
authorized and appropriated by Congress for its operations”). 
 122. See, e.g., Andrew Ackerman & Aruna Viswanatha, SEC Bickering Stalls Mary Jo White’s 
Agenda, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2015, 9:55 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-bickering-derails-
whites-agenda-1433374702 (describing conflict over policy choices of SEC commissioners). 
 123. Cf. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (raising 
concerns about the SEC’s enforcement policy choices and, as a result, refusing to approve proposed 
settlement of SEC enforcement action), vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 124. See, e.g., James D. Cox, et al., Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have 
Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893 (2005) (reporting on evidence about 
firms targeted by SEC enforcement actions versus firms targeted only by private securities fraud class 
actions).  
 125. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1072–73 (2000) (explaining the advantages of common-law 
adjudication as a method of lawmaking). 
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regulatory demands. Again, the case of federal securities fraud offers an 
illustration. The public capital markets have shifted, over the past sixty 
years, from retail to largely institutional markets, with an ever-diminishing 
share of US equities held by retail investors.
126
 Both institutional and retail 
money has moved, to an increasing degree, into indexed investments that 
are not made on the basis of information disclosure or issuer 
fundamentals.
127
 New types of traders have entered the market, such as 
hedge funds and high-frequency traders.
128
 Market information has shifted 
from paper-based disclosure documents to the internet and is conveyed 
through an ever-growing range of intermediaries.
129
 As the nature of the 
market changes, so do the nature of securities fraud and the scope of 
litigation necessary to deter such fraud effectively, as well as the costs and 
benefits of an enforcement regime.  
A lawmaking partnership offers two different mechanisms for 
identifying and responding to these developments, reflecting the different 
expertise and informational access of the courts and Congress. Thus, for 
example, Basic responded to the impersonal nature of the public capital 
markets by recognizing the difficulty for investors of proving reliance 
directly.
130
 The PSLRA responded to the emergence of institutional 
investors by harnessing their larger stakes and greater sophistication in the 
form of the lead plaintiff as a way of controlling litigation decisions.
131
 
SLUSA responded to an effort by the plaintiffs’ bar to shift litigation into 
state court in order to avoid provisions such as the discovery stay.
132
 The 
Court interpreted the heightened pleading standard of the PSLRA in a 
manner that effectively implemented Congress’s gatekeeping objective in 
 
 
 126. Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
1961, 1962–63 (2010) (describing shift from retail to institutional ownership); Luis A. Aguilar, 
Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Institutional Investors: Power and Responsibility (Apr. 19, 
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515808 (explaining 
various developments in the size and structure of the capital markets over the past several decades). 
 127. See, e.g., RUSSELL INVESTMENTS, INDEX INDUSTRY INNOVATION LEADS TO GROWING 
ADOPTION OF ETFS AMONG INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 1 (2014) (reporting that “assets in index-
based strategies reached more than $7 trillion worldwide in 2013”). 
 128. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 
37 J. CORP. L. 265, 296–97 (2012) (describing the evolution of the “transient” institutional investor). 
 129. Commentators have observed the challenges posed by these changes for years. See, e.g., 
Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 747 (1985) (exploring the effect of new technology on the costs of gathering and 
disseminating investment information); Neil D. Schwartz, Wall Street? Where We’re Going We Don’t 
Need Wall Street: Do Securities Regulators Stand a Chance in Cyberspace?, 8 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & 
POL’Y 79, 83 (1998) (observing that “New Technology Is Reshaping the Securities Markets”). 
 130.  See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240–47 (1988). 
 131.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2014). 
 132.  See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2014). 
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light of its observations about the challenges of pleading the required state 
of mind.
133
 
V. THE LAWMAKING PARTNERSHIP BEYOND HALLIBURTON II 
A. Other Applications of the Partnership Framework  
The analysis in this Article is broadly applicable outside the area of 
federal securities fraud. Although consideration of the lawmaking 
partnership in the context of other statutory schemes is beyond the scope 
of this Article, securities regulation alone offers numerous instances in 
which the collaborative interplay of congressional and judicial lawmaking 
suggests that the Court should apply a more flexible and goal-oriented 
approach to interpreting the applicable statute.
134
 Within federal securities 
fraud litigation, evidence of a lawmaking partnership might inform the 
Court’s analysis of a variety of issues. 
One such issue is the extraterritorial scope of the antifraud provision. 
For many years, the courts applied section 10(b) to fraud involving 
conduct or effects within the United States.
135
 Congress did not interfere 
with these decisions for decades, allowing the courts to act in a “quasi-
legislative role.”136 In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Court 
overturned these decisions and concluded that section 10(b) did not extend 
outside the United States.
137
 Congress subsequently responded to Morrison 
in Dodd-Frank, both by reinstating the conduct and effects tests for SEC 
enforcement actions,
138
 and by ordering the SEC to “solicit public 
comment and thereafter conduct a study to determine the extent to which 
private rights of action under the antifraud provisions of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . should be extended.”139  
 
 
 133. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 134. Similarly, the courts should consider the existence of a partnership in evaluating the 
legitimacy of agency rulemaking. See Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the 
Future of SEC Rulemaking, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695, 697–98 (2013) (criticizing the DC Circuit 
Court’s Business Roundtable decision, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 
for ignoring congressional policy judgments about SEC adoption of a federal proxy access rule). 
 135. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign Tender 
Offers, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 523, 542–43 (1993) (describing conducts and effects tests). 
 136. Jennifer Wu, Morrison v. Dodd-Frank: Deciphering the Congressional Rebuttal to the 
Supreme Court’s Ruling, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 317, 328 (2011).  
 137. 561 U.S. 247, 273 (2010). 
 138. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (2010). 
 139. Id. § 929Y(a). 
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A second issue that has involved collaboration between the Court and 
Congress is determining the appropriate scope of liability exposure for 
secondary defendants. As with Morrison, the lower courts had applied the 
concept of aiding and abetting from the common law to private claims for 
federal securities fraud.
140
 In Central Bank, the Supreme Court rejected 
that approach, holding that section 10(b) does not create a cause of action 
for aiding and abetting.
141
 Congress subsequently responded to the 
concerns about the potential adverse effects of liability for secondary 
defendants in the PSLRA.
142
 Nonetheless, in Stoneridge Investment 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,
143
 the Court concluded that 
section 10(b) did not provide a private right of action against defendants 
who did not make fraudulent statements to the investing public.
144
 Most 
recently, Congress responded in Dodd-Frank with modifications to the 
liability exposure of secondary defendants—expanding the SEC’s 
authority to bring aiding and abetting claims and lowering the required 
state of mind for such liability from knowledge to recklessness.
145
 In 
addition, Dodd-Frank required the US Government Accountability Office 
to conduct a study on the impact of a private right of action for aiding and 
abetting.
146
 
The partnership analysis also offers insights with respect to the 
determination of the required mental state for fraud liability. The Court 
rejected negligence based liability in Ernst and held that scienter was the 
necessary state of mind, but it declined to define scienter or to determine 
whether proof of recklessness was sufficient.
147
 Congress did not specify 
the required state of mind when it adopted the PSLRA. Instead, it crafted 
the heightened pleading requirement to incorporate the judicially-created 
ambiguity—providing that the plaintiff “state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required 
state of mind.”148 In turn, the Court took on the task of interpreting this 
 
 
 140. Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability Standards for 
Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1297 (1999).  
 141. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 170–92 
(1994).  
 142. See Fisch, supra note 140, at 1293–94.  
 143. 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 144. Id. at 154–67. 
 145. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§§ 929M–O, 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (2010). 
 146. Id. § 929Z(a). 
 147. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, 193 n.12 (1976).  
 148. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2014) (emphasis added). 
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provision in Tellabs,
149
 and it concluded that, because Congress did not 
“throw much light” on what was meant by a “strong inference,” its task 
was to “prescribe a workable construction . . . geared to the PSLRA’s twin 
goals: to curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving 
investors’ ability to recover on meritorious claims.”150  
B. The Lawmaking Partnership and Insider Trading 
Perhaps the most compelling example of the lawmaking partnership is 
the development of the legal prohibition on insider trading.
151
 Because the 
scope of insider trading regulation and the appropriate role for the 
judiciary in developing insider trading law are currently the subject of 
some debate
152
 after the Second Circuit’s recent Newman decision,153 this 
Article will briefly consider the implications of the lawmaking partnership 
framework for that debate. 
Federal insider trading liability is based on section 10(b), the same 
general antifraud provision discussed earlier in this Article in the context 
of private securities fraud. The statute itself contains no reference to 
insider trading or nonpublic information.
154
 Instead, insider trading 
liability has been developed through the joint actions of the Court and 
Congress.
155
 
The Court moved first. In Chiarella v. United States, the Court 
accepted the premise that trading on material inside information could 
 
 
 149. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 150. Id. at 321–22 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 151. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice 
Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 S.M.U. L. REV. 1589, 1628 (1999) (arguing that 
“the Supreme Court should treat the insider trading prohibition as though it were a species of federal 
common law”). 
 152. See, e.g., Tanya Dmitronow et al., After Newman, Congress Seeks to Define Insider Trading, 
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP CORPORATE DEFENSE AND DISPUTES BLOG (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www. 
corporatedefensedisputes.com/2015/03/after-newman-congress-seeks-to-define-insider-trading/ (“Ever 
since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its landmark decision in United States v. 
Newman, debate has raged about whether the court has sanctioned insider trading or has appropriately 
restrained the Government’s efforts to prosecute innocent market conduct—and whether the judiciary, 
rather than Congress, should be defining and outlawing insider trading in the first place.”). 
 153. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 154. See Paul D. Brachman, Note, Outlawing Honest Graft, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
261, 278 (2013) (“There is no federal statute that specifically prohibits [insider trading].”).  
 155. The actions of the SEC and the Department of Justice in bringing insider trading cases before 
the Court obviously play a critical role as well. This Article will address the SEC’s role below. See 
infra notes 188–211 and accompanying text. 
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constitute securities fraud.
156
 The Court’s holding was a restrictive one, 
however. It concluded that insider trading liability was premised on the 
fiduciary duties owed by corporate insiders to the corporation.
157
 
Corporate insiders who possessed no such duties could not be liable under 
this classical theory because their failure to disclose material nonpublic 
information did not constitute actionable fraud.
158
 Importantly, the Court 
observed that its conclusion was not grounded in the statutory text or a 
finding of congressional intent, noting that “neither the legislative history 
nor the statute itself affords specific guidance” as to the circumstances in 
which “silence may constitute a manipulative or deceptive device.”159  
Chiarella did not address situations in which insiders, rather than 
trading themselves, disclose inside information to others who subsequently 
trade. In 1983, the Court addressed this so-called “tipping” in Dirks v. 
SEC.
160
 Importantly, Dirks reinforced the Court’s holding in Chiarella that 
insider trading required a predicate breach of fiduciary duty.
161
 In Dirks, 
the Court concluded that tippees could only be liable if the tipper breached 
a fiduciary duty in disclosing the inside information and if the tippee knew 
of the breach.
162
 Dirks further explained that a tipper breached his or her 
duty by receiving a personal benefit in exchange for the tip or if he or she 
intended to bestow a gift on the recipient.
163
  
Many commentators were dissatisfied with the limitations on insider 
trading liability imposed by the Chiarella and Dirks decisions.
164
 
Commentators also raised objections to the regulatory ambiguity.
165
 As 
Senator Alfonse D’Amato observed: “the present state of uncertainty 
about the law is simply not acceptable.”166 Between 1986 and 1988, 
 
 
 156. 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (“Application of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that 
corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder’s welfare before their own, will not 
benefit personally through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information.”). 
 157.  Id. at 224–30. 
 158.  Id. at 231–35. 
 159. Id. at 226. 
 160. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 161. Id. at 660. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. at 663–64. 
 164. See, e.g., Richard M. Phillips & Larry R. Lavoie, The SEC’s Proposed Insider Trading 
Legislation: Insider Trading Controls, Corporate Secrecy, and Full Disclosure, 39 ALA. L. REV. 439, 
446–50 (1988). 
 165. See Richard W. Painter et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. 
O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 227–28 (1998) (identifying confusion in the law of insider trading and 
arguing that “[a]bsent congressional action, the definition of illegal trading on proscribed 
informational advantages will remain incomplete, unsystematic, and analytically unsatisfying”).  
 166. 133 CONG. REC. S16,393 (daily ed. June 17, 1987) (statement of Sen. Alfonse D’Amato). 
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Congress held four separate sets of hearings devoted specifically to insider 
trading regulation.
167
 
In 1984, Congress adopted its first response to the Chiarella and Dirks 
decisions. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
168
 did not revise the 
judicial approach to insider trading liability or expand the scope of the 
prohibition but merely made minor modifications to insider trading 
liability, including a prohibition on the trading of options and other 
derivatives in circumstances in which it would be illegal to trade stock and 
a provision providing for treble damages.
169
 The adoption of the 1984 
statute suggested that Congress was aware of the scope of insider trading 
liability reflected in the Dirks and Chiarella decisions and chose not to 
alter this scope. Despite the urging of several witnesses, Congress did not 
adopt a formal definition of insider trading in the statute.
170
 
In 1987, in response to a request from the Senate Securities 
Subcommittee, the SEC drafted proposed legislation that would have 
provided a definition of insider trading and modified several aspects of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions.171 A specific issue that had divided lower 
courts was the extent to which insider trading liability could be premised 
on an alternative theory: the misappropriation theory.
172
 The SEC’s draft 
legislation sought to codify the misappropriation theory and to specify the 
circumstances and relationships that might give rise to a predicate duty.
173
 
Congress chose again, however, not to adopt the misappropriation theory 
or any type of statutory definition.
174
 Instead, in the Insider Trading and 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (“ITSFEA”), Congress 
 
 
 167. Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s, 
82 IND. L.J. 575, 576 (2007). 
 168. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78o, 78t, 78u, 78ff (2014).  
 169. Id. 
 170. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 13 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2286; see also 
Painter et al., supra note 165, at 201–02.  
 171. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CATO INST., CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 101: SEC’S INSIDER 
TRADING PROPOSAL: GOOD POLITICS, BAD POLICY (1988), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/ 
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa101.pdf.  
 172. See Elliot J. Weiss, United States v. O’Hagan: Pragmatism Returns to the Law of Insider 
Trading, 23 J. CORP. L. 395 (1998). The misappropriation theory was based on language in Chief 
Justice Burger’s dissent in Chiarella. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 243–45 (1980) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that Chiarella’s misappropriation of information that belonged to his 
employer violated section 10(b)). 
 173. MACEY, supra note 171; see also The Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 40 
(1987) (statement of David S. Ruder, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).  
 174. Painter et al., supra note 165, at 201–02. 
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increased the penalties for insider trading and also added a private remedy 
for contemporaneous traders.
175
  
Notably, however, Congress did not codify the misappropriation 
theory, which was enjoying general acceptance in the lower courts.
176
 
Indeed, ITSFEA contained explicit findings that the SEC’s rules regarding 
insider trading were “necessary and appropriate,” and that it had “enforced 
such rules and regulations vigorously, effectively, and fairly.”177 As Steve 
Thel argues, these findings can be read as a congressional endorsement of 
the misappropriation theory.
178
  
The Supreme Court accepted the misappropriation theory in 
O’Hagan.179 Importantly, the O’Hagan decision departed from the narrow 
approach to insider trading liability reflected in Chiarella and Dirks, 
relying instead on policy considerations to support its characterization of 
misappropriation as informational fraud.
180
 As Justice Ginsberg explained, 
the misappropriation theory is “tuned to an animating purpose of the 
Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote 
investor confidence.”181 
The O’Hagan decision did not eliminate all confusion over the scope 
of insider trading liability exposure.
182
 The Court’s acceptance of the 
misappropriation theory, however, reduced the pressure on Congress to 
adopt insider trading legislation.
183
 This outcome was viewed as less than 
optimal by some commentators who had argued that the scope of insider 
trading liability should be definitively resolved through legislation.
184
 
 
 
 175. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 
Stat. 4677 (1988). 
 176. See Weiss, supra note 172, at 398–422. 
 177. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 2. 
 178. See generally Steve Thel, Statutory Findings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50 VAND. L. 
REV. 1091 (1997). 
 179. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 180. See Weiss, supra note 172, at 398 (explaining that the Court “explicitly relied on 
considerations of public policy to explain its support for the misappropriation theory”); see also 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658–59 (justifying Court’s holding in terms of the investor’s “informational 
disadvantage” relative to the insider). 
 181. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658. 
 182. See Painter et al., supra note 165, at 202 (identifying continuing issues of ambiguity and 
concern); cf. Weiss, supra note 172, at 438 (concluding that, although O’Hagan leaves “a few loose 
ends,” it “comes close to completing the development of a sensible, comprehensive regulatory 
framework”). 
 183. See, e.g., Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading: The Supreme Court 
Misappropriates the Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157, 1212 (1997) (“[W]ith 
the misappropriation theory firmly in place, Congress lacks the impetus to define through legislation 
the parameters of insider trading liability.”). 
 184. See, e.g., Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading 
Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1304 n.373 (1998) (citing sources). 
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Congress adopted additional insider trading legislation in 2012 when it 
passed the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (“STOCK 
Act”).185 The STOCK Act prohibits members of Congress from trading on 
inside information.
186
 Two aspects of the STOCK Act reinforce the 
characterization of the development of insider trading regulation as a 
collaborative process. First, Congress again declined to provide a statutory 
definition of insider trading. Second, in extending the prohibition, 
Congress incorporated the fiduciary duty approach reflected in the Court’s 
decisions. Specifically, the Act provides that members of Congress owe a 
duty of trust and confidence to Congress, the federal government, and US 
citizens “solely for purposes of the insider trading prohibitions.”187  
C. A Third Partner—The SEC 
The example of insider trading introduces an additional dynamic into 
the lawmaking process—the SEC. As discussed in Part II of this Article, 
commentators have devoted considerable energy to debating the 
appropriate extent to which Congress should delegate lawmaking authority 
to federal agencies.
188
 Much of that debate focuses on the appropriate 
scope of agency rulemaking. Courts exercise oversight over agency 
rulemaking through application of the nondelegation doctrine, although 
the Supreme Court’s application of this doctrine has been extremely 
limited.
189
 Courts have also scrutinized agency rulemaking to ensure that it 
falls within Congress’s delegation of authority190 and is exercised in a 
manner that is not arbitrary and capricious.
191
  
The SEC’s role with respect to insider trading, at least initially, was not 
legislative in nature. Rather than formulating the scope of liability through 
formal rulemaking, the SEC fashioned the liability standard by bringing 
enforcement actions that were, in some cases, supplemented by 
 
 
 185. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (“STOCK Act”), Pub. L. No. 112-
105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. § 4(g)(1); see also Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider 
Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845, 849–50 (2013) 
(explaining how structure of the STOCK Act incorporated the Court’s fiduciary approach). 
 188. See supra Part II. 
 189. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000). 
 190. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 
(1984) (holding that courts should defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of statutory authority 
rather than substituting their own interpretation).  
 191. The source of the arbitrary and capricious standard is the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”). 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2014); see generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (exemplifying the “hard look” approach to review under the APA). 
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Department of Justice criminal prosecutions.
192
 It was the SEC—not 
Congress or the courts—that made the initial decision to use the general 
antifraud provision as a basis for imposing insider trading liability.
193
 
Subsequently, the SEC’s enforcement actions have repeatedly tested the 
boundaries of existing law and offered new theories of liability.
194
 
Although enforcement has been the agency’s primary lawmaking role, 
the SEC has also responded to restrictive judicial decisions through formal 
rulemaking. For example, the SEC responded to the narrow scope of the 
Chiarella decision by promulgating Rule 14e-3,
195
 which prohibits insider 
trading in connection with a tender offer and does not require a fiduciary 
duty.
196
 The SEC responded to the information asymmetries authorized by 
the Dirks decision by adopting Regulation FD.
197
 The SEC also 
“extend[ed] the boundaries of Rule 10b-5 through the promulgation of 
Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2.”198 Rule 10b5-1 attempts to resolve a debate 
over whether mere possession of material nonpublic information is enough 
for liability by prohibiting trading if the defendant is “aware of the 
material, nonpublic information” when making the trade.199 Rule 10b5-2 
provides a non-exclusive definition of circumstances in which a person 
will be deemed to have a relationship of trust and confidence for purposes 
of the misappropriation theory.
200
  
The inclusion of the SEC in the lawmaking partnership adds an 
additional dimension to the lawmaking process. In many cases, Congress 
 
 
 192. Commentators have termed this approach “regulation by enforcement,” and some have been 
highly critical. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A 
Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 155 (1990); see also John Van De Weert & 
Maria Earley, CFPB Blurs Line Between Enforcement, Regulation, NAT’L L.J. (May 25, 2015), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202727293268/CFPB-Blurs-Line-Between-Enforcement-
Regulation?slreturn=20151012160901 (describing similar approach by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau). 
 193. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). 
 194. See, e.g., James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities 
Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 151 (2012) (“Throughout the years, the SEC has consistently pushed 
the boundaries of insider trading law.”). 
 195. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2015). 
 196. Id.; Joseph E. Miller, Jr., Comment, SEC v. Peters: Stabilizing the Regulation of Tender 
Offer Insider Trading Without a Fiduciary Duty, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 783, 786 (1994). 
 197. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2015); see Jill Fisch, Regulation FD: An Alternative Approach to 
Addressing Information Asymmetry, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 112–15 (Stephen 
M. Bainbridge ed., 2013). 
 198. John C. Coffee, Jr., Introduction: Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of 
Boundaries, Gaps, and Strategies, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281, 285. 
 199. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 33,7881, 73 SEC 
Docket 3, 19 (Aug. 15, 2000). 
 200. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material 
Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 897 (2010) (discussing Rule 10b5-2). 
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and the Court have embraced the SEC’s lawmaking initiatives, agreeing 
that the SEC’s approach furthered their common policy objectives. Thus, 
for example, Congress explicitly found, in section 2 of the ITSFEA, that 
the SEC’s rules and regulations governing insider trading were “necessary 
and appropriate,” and that the Commission had “enforced such rules and 
regulations vigorously, effectively, and fairly.”201 Similarly in O’Hagan, 
the Court both accepted the misappropriation theory proffered by the 
government as encompassing the necessary deception required by its 
earlier decisions
202
 and upheld the SEC’s adoption of Rule 14e-3.203  
In other cases, however, the Court has restrained the SEC’s 
enforcement zeal. As noted above, even as the Court accepted insider 
trading liability in Chiarella, and extended that liability to tippees in 
Dirks, it held that the SEC’s desired scope of liability was too broad.204 In 
particular, the Court has rejected the SEC’s desired parity-of-information 
standard.
205
 Similarly, in Dirks, the Court insisted that tippee liability be 
premised both upon a breach of fiduciary duty and the tippee’s awareness 
of that breach, finding support for this approach in the scienter 
requirement.
206
  
Recent enforcements by the SEC have raised similar concerns in the 
lower courts. Mark Cuban fought a five-year battle with the SEC and 
won.
207
 Cuban also raised questions about the validity of Rule 10b5-2, 
questions that the District Court took seriously
208
 but were mooted by 
 
 
 201. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, §2, 102 
Stat. 4677, 4677 (1988). 
 202. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997) (“The misappropriation theory advanced 
by the Government is consistent with Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 . . . (1977), a 
decision underscoring that § 10(b) is not an all-purpose breach of fiduciary duty ban; rather, it trains 
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changes in the SEC’s theory of liability.209 In United States v. Newman, 
the Second Circuit overturned the convictions of two hedge fund 
managers, third- and fourth-degree “remote tippees.”210 Citing Dirks, the 
court stated that the defendants’ liability required the tipper to obtain a 
personal benefit from tipping, and that there was insufficient evidence 
even that the insiders had received a personal benefit, and “absolutely no 
. . . evidence” that the defendants had any knowledge about a personal 
benefit.
211
 
D. Implications of the Lawmaking Partnership for Insider Trading 
Existing insider trading law is the product of a lawmaking partnership, 
as conceptualized by this Article. Insider trading liability is premised on 
section 10(b), an open-textured statute—indeed, the statute is so open-
textured that it does not even mention insider trading explicitly. The Court, 
Congress, and the SEC have made multiple adjustments and refinements 
to the regulation of insider trading. In each case, these adjustments have 
been cognizant of and responsive to the efforts of other lawmaking 
partners. Finally, as with private securities fraud litigation, the lawmaking 
enterprise seeks to appear to share the common objectives of addressing 
information disparities in the securities markets and maintaining public 
confidence
212
 while providing sufficient limiting principles to allow the 
necessary information flow to preserve healthy and efficient markets.
213
  
Insider trading also demonstrates the advantages of the lawmaking 
partnership as a tool to develop financial regulation. Congress, and to 
some degree the SEC, have been responsive to politically based concerns 
such as the public demand for greater enforcement penalties in the wake of 
Wall Street scandals. The Court, with its greater degree of political 
insulation, is able to provide a constraint on excess enforcement zeal, 
balancing these demands with concerns over predictability, information 
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flow, and market efficiency. Judicial oversight can also check headline-
driven lawmaking agendas, pushing particularly the SEC to justify its 
regulatory choices better.
214
 Thus, for example, the Court’s decision in 
Dirks led the SEC to focus its efforts to reduce information asymmetries 
on issuer disclosure rather than recipient use of material nonpublic 
information through the adoption of Regulation FD.
215
 The Second 
Circuit’s decision in Newman may similarly encourage the SEC to direct 
greater attention to tippers/sources rather than remote tippees.
216
 Congress 
also weighed in to readjust the SEC’s enforcement priorities with the 
adoption of the STOCK Act.
217
 Notably, prior to the legislation, no 
member of Congress had been the subject of an insider trading 
enforcement action
218
 despite evidence suggesting widespread use of 
material nonpublic information.
219
  
Finally, the lawmaking partnership is well positioned to respond to the 
dynamic structure of the securities markets and the evolution of 
information flow due to changes in technology and market participants. 
Since the Chiarella decision, the markets have seen the emergence of 
many new types of traders and trading strategies—hedge funds, high-
frequency traders, algorithmic trading, and index funds are all examples.
220
 
Competition has led to new demands for information, which are met by 
innovations such as web crawlers, expert network firms, electronic road 
shows, and more.
221
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These developments offer new challenges—both in defining material 
nonpublic information and in identifying the manners of acquiring that 
information that should be characterized as improper.
222
 While the 
financial incentives for acquiring an informational advantage are higher 
than ever, the value of maintaining a rich information environment offers 
reasons to be cautious about expansive liability provisions. A lawmaking 
partnership is well suited to maintaining the necessary balance.  
These insights are of particular value in the aftermath of the Newman 
decision.
223
 The Newman decision renewed the long-dormant efforts to 
have Congress adopt a definition of insider trading.
224
 Some commentators 
have pointed to the decision as demonstrating the need for legislation to 
ensure that courts do not interpret the law too narrowly.
225
 Properly 
understanding insider trading regulation as the product of a lawmaking 
partnership, however, rebuts that claim and demonstrates that judicial 
oversight has provided a valuable counterbalance to regulatory excess 
while retaining flexibility to address market innovation.
226
 As SEC Chair 
Mary Jo White explained: “I think it’s challenging to codify [insider 
trading law] clearly in a way that is both not too broad and retains the 
strength of common law.”227 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Commentators have identified a variety of structural and political 
pressures that constrain the effectiveness of the lawmaking process with 
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respect to financial regulation.
228
 The lawmaking partnership offers one 
possible response. Through a judicial-congressional collaboration, the 
lawmaking partnership enables the courts and Congress to temper their 
own institutional shortcomings. This has led, in the context of private 
securities litigation, to a balance that serves the dual objectives of investor 
protection and limiting the potential for litigation abuse. The structural 
advantages of the lawmaking partnership support both deference to this 
balance and a broader endorsement of the lawmaking partnership. 
In the case of Halliburton II, the implications of this analysis suggest 
that the Court reached the correct result in declining to overrule Basic, 
although perhaps for the wrong reasons. More broadly, the analysis 
suggests that the Court should give greater weight to congressional action 
in considering the scope of private litigation under section 10(b), and, 
where Congress has participated in a collaborative process with objectives 
common to those of the Court, that the Court should view that 
participation as authorization to engage in its own policy analysis in 
furtherance of those objectives. Judicial lawmaking in this context should 
be understood not as unprincipled activism, but as consistent with a 
congressional choice of a lawmaking approach that offers distinctive 
advantages. 
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